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The fact of Vladimir Putin taking office in Russia was supposed to
lead, as was widely expected, to profound changes in the politi-
cal and economic spheres. Instead, during the first year of his
presidency, most of the actions initiated were aimed at consoli-
dating presidential power and developing means of control over
the situation in the country. These actions have achieved modest
success, as they have decreased the political role of the circles
that until then had been keeping a check on the presidential po-
wer. However, there is still a series of factors that can limit the
KremlinÕs influence on the situation in Russia.
Out of the numerous ambitious reforms that were to have been
effected in political, social and economic spheres, hardly any ha-
ve been carried out Ð almost exclusively those that concerned
administrative and fiscal issues. The second half of the year bo-
re witness to a decrease in the dynamics of the reform process,
and the authoritiesÕ lack of consistency in taking their actions be-
came clearly apparent. This was due, among other reasons, to
some objective difficulties and to the great complexity of the
planned reforms. Another important factor was the diversity of
the central power apparatus, which was divided into informal
groups, each of which often had divergent interests and a diffe-
rent vision of the countryÕs development. Afurther factor was the
lack of political will on the part of the key decision-makers, with
President Putin at their head. 
On the increase, in return, was a menace to freedom of speech,
the rule of law and building a civil society in Russia. 
In order to achieve the objectives set by the Russian authorities
Ð and particularly in order to modernise the country and reach the
fast rate of economic growth that will allow the gap between Rus-
sia and the most developed countries of the world to be bridged,
and secure Russia a respected place in the international arena Ð
it would be necessary to take decisive actions. These would in-
clude, in particular, attracting foreign capital by accelerating the
process of essential reforms and Ð first and foremost Ð initiating
structural reforms that would lessen RussiaÕs dependence on the
international economic situation; deregulating the economy, and
limiting the complex and ineffective functioning of the welfare
state. As far as internal policy is concerned, the following would
be conducive to development: maintaining civil liberties, mecha-
nisms of democracy and gradual building of acivil society (the Ôli-
beralÕ model). An alternative to this approach would be to make
purely cosmetic changes that lead towards economic stagnation
and further consolidation of the stateÕs control over socio-politi-
cal and economic life. If social tensions were exacerbated, the
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authorities would attempt to consolidate society in the face of 
alleged external enemies, which would result in a significant 
enhancement of authoritarianism (the ÔconservativeÕ model). It
seems that despite favourable political and economic conditions
Ð prosperity and strong social support for the President Ð the 
authorities have not decided yet on consistent implementation of
the ÔliberalÕ model. The current Kremlin policy is based on ste-
ering the middle course between the two options: attempting to
combine semi-authoritarianism (while maintaining formal demo-
cratic institutions) with semi-liberalism in the area of the econo-
my. The continuation of such apolicy and inconsistent implemen-
tation of reforms can, with time, make Russia drift into the Ôcon-
servativeÕ model through recession. The implementation of the
ÔliberalÕ model (at least in the economic sphere) is still possible,
but it would require profound personnel changes in the state ap-
paratus, and agreement upon its common ideology and program-
me. It would also require the Kremlin to give up the imperative of
political consensus on implementing the reforms and approving
the temporary social costs related to the reforms. In the spring of
2001 we have seen, as a matter of fact, some attempts to acce-
lerate reform implementation and the presidential address to the
Federal Assembly was delivered in a spirit of cautious liberalism.
The question of the authoritiesÕ political will, however, still re-
mains open. 
A full year has passed since Vladimir Putin was sworn in as the
President of the Russian Federation on 7 May 2000, five months
after he had taken over the duties of the head of state from Boris
Yeltsin. This fact may induce us to try and sum up the changes
that have occurred in Russia under the rule of the new leader.
The following text is an overview of the reforms implemented by
the Russian authorities over the course of the year. It also points
to those reform-oriented actions declared earlier, which are either
being implemented ater some delay, or which have not yet star-
ted at all. The way the reforms have been implemented is also
assessed. 
This text gives us a better view on the main trends for changes
that have recently come into being in Russia during the period di-
scussed. The tendencies are a result of both the reforms decla-
red, and other actions on the part of the authorities, as well as of
the processes taking place in the country.
The text ends with some general conclusions and forecasts for fu-
ture developments. 
I. Russian reforms: plans and 
implementation
The necessity to carry out far-reaching reforms in both the politi-
cal-administrative and socio-economic spheres was already he-
ralded in consecutive policy speeches delivered by Vladimir Pu-
tin: the speech entitled ÔRussia at the Turn of the MillenniumsÕ,
delivered by Prime Minister Putin at the convention of the pro-
Kremlin movement ÔUnityÕ on 29 December 1999 [see Appendix I],
and ÔVladimir PutinÕs Open Letter to the Russian ElectorateÕ
published on 25 February 2000. These were full of slogans pro-
mising to rebuild Russia, to overcome crisis phenomena, to con-
solidate the state and to create an effective economy that would
ensure proper economic growth. This was all supposed to take
place in an evolutionary way, without shocks. The declared impe-
rative was not to lower the citizensÕ standard of living.
Such vague slogans, however, could not substitute for a real pro-
gramme of reforms. After six months of official work on the pro-
gramme, it was drawn up in May 2000. Its authors are specialists
from the Center for Strategic Studies, which was set up in autumn
1999 on the initiative of Prime Minister Putin. German Gref, who
enjoyed the PresidentÕs confidence, headed the Centre, and it
was with his name that the prepared ÔDevelopment Strategy
until 2010 for the Russian FederationÕ was most often signed.
This very extensive document (around 500 pages), which conta-
ined a detailed plan of reforms to be implemented in the political-
administrative, social and economic spheres, has never been pu-
blished in its full version. In May 2000 the ÔPriority Action PlansÕ
that had been attached to the document were leaked to the press.
After GrefÕs programme had been amended, it was provisionally
adopted by the government (the programme was simultaneously
submitted for further discussion). At the end of July, on the basis
of this programme, the cabinet adopted another document enti-
tled ÔMain Actions of the Government of the Russian Federa-
tion in the Field of Social Policy and in Modernising the Eco-
nomy for 2000Ð2001Õ (published). The government document
specified Ð in comparison to GrefÕsversion Ð certain plans for le-
gislative actions, it changed certain dates and, principally, it
completely excluded the political part of the programme (as being
outside the governmentÕ s competence) [see Appendix II]. An abrid-
g e d ÔGref programmeÕ became the programme of Mikhail Casia-
novÕsgovernment. However, having confirmed his mandate in the
March 2000 elections, President Putin presented an official inter-
pretation of his policy in his ÔAddress to the Federal AssemblyÕ,
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delivered on 8 July 2000. At the end of March, following further
work on the ÔGref programmeÕ, the government provisionally 
adopted new versions of amedium-term programme and ashort-
term programme for 2001Ð2004 (which are still to be worked on).
New declarations, concerning economic reforms in particular, 
were included by the president in another ÔAddress to the Fede-
ral AssemblyÕ, delivered on 3 April 2001. Eventually, at the end of
April, a programme for economic policy in the near future, prepa-
red jointly by the government and the central bank, was adopted
and the President presented the budget policy guidelines for 2002. 
1. Reforms that have been implemented 
or reforms that are still being implemented
In May 2000, after Vladimir Putin had been sworn in as president,
the Russian authorities started to implement both the declared
reforms and changes that had not been previously mentioned.
These actions concerned mainly the sphere of power, including
personnel policy, relationship with the regions, relations with me-
dia and big business circles. To the observers of the Russian po-
litical scene, it all appeared as if far-reaching changes to the 
countryÕs political and economic systems were being made. 
With time, however, other tendencies became visible as well. In
some cases, when it faced political resistance, the Kremlin star-
ted to compromise and the radical spirit of its actions Ð particu-
larly in the socio-economic sphere Ð faded. Autumn witnessed
a slowdown in the pace of certain reforms. Many of the actions
which had been previously heralded Ð especially in the area of 
liberalisin the economy, reshuffling the structures of power and
reforming the police Ð were put on hold or did not start at all. 
Consequently, the total effect of the reforms implemented during
the first year of Vladimir PutinÕs rule was not as impressive as
had seemed at first. In 2000 and in the first quarter of 2001 the
following reforms were implemented: 
A. In the political-administrative sphere
Reform of administration and 
of federal relations
This reform involved several decisions. First of all, the creation Ð
in May 2000 Ð of new units of federal administration (which do
not, however, constitute a new level of administrative division, and
do not change the status of the federal authorities) Ð 7 Federal 
Districts (FD) and the appointment of presidential representati-
ves in the FDs. At the same time the process of setting up bran-
ches of federal bodies in the FDs began, including, first and fore-
most, the police and secret service. The presidential representa-
tives in the FDs gained Ð formally Ð supervisory powers (but not
ruling powers) over regional administration. 
The President also started work on certain legal acts targeted at
changing the way the Federation Council (FC) Ð the upper cham-
ber of the Russian parliament Ð is composed, and introducing the
possibility of dismissing the heads of the executive and to disso-
lve regional legislative bodies if they infringe the law. In August
2000 the President introduced the billÕs adoption by both cham-
bers of parliament. In its final version the bill stipulated that the
regional heads of the legislative and the executive would lose the-
ir seats in the FC (as well as their senatorial immunity), but they
would gain the right to appoint FC members. These changes are
being gradually implemented until the beginning of 2002. The
President also gained the right to dismiss heads of the executive
and to dissolve regional legislative bodies if the law is infringed,
but this procedure was subject to judicial control. The heads of
the regions gained the right to dismiss the heads of local govern-
ments of smaller cities and, by analogy, the President gained the
same right towards the mayors of larger cities.
A process of screening regional legislation was also started, in or-
der to harmonise it with the constitution and with the federal legi-
slation (according to the President himself, 25% of regional legisla-
tion was at variance with the latter). At the end of 2000, according
to the reports of the authoritiesÕ representatives, 70% of the legi-
slation that had been at variance with the federal law had been
successfully harmonised. The process has not been completed yet. 
For 2001, the authorities are planning to settle the issue of clear
division of powers between federal and regional bodies. 
B. In the social sphere
Social welfare reform
The process of abolishing most social allowances has started. So-
me of them are being substituted by salary raises and offers of in-
dividual help for those who need it most. This provokes objections
from both left-wing and conservative forces. President Putin per-
sonally intervened in the issue of abolishing allowances for milita-
ry men Ð by means of forcing the government to compensate for
that through a salary rise. This reform has not been completed yet. 
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C. In the economic sphere
Tax reform
On the initiative of the government and in compliance with the
Gref programme, the parliament has passed part of the Tax Code.
It introduced fundamental changes to personal income tax (NIP).
A low, 13% flat tax rate was fixed. The changes entered into for-
ce from the beginning of 2001. Despite controversies, a uniform
social tax with a regressive rate was introduced (in place of wri-
te-offs for 3 different funds). It was, however, agreed that the
process of standardising funds would progress gradually. Besi-
des, the Code provides for rises in some VAT rates and excise du-
ty (particularly for petrol and cigarettes). The part of the Code
concerning corporate income tax is in the pipeline. It is expected
to enter into force at the beginning of 2002. 
Customs policy reform
The government reduced the number of tariff units, and reduced
duties on certain groups of commodities. The changes came into
force at the beginning of 2001. However, the scope of reductions
was lower than originally planned, due to strong pressure exerted
by lobbyists.
The Customs Code is currently being worked on. There are plans
to change customs duty rates further, and to reform the customs
administration system. 
Reforms for removing bureaucratic barriers 
in the economy 
The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade prepared
a package of bills that included the elimination of licensing pro-
cedures for certain types of business activity, and introduced the
Ôone-counterÕ principle in administrative procedure concerning
business activity, as well as a significant simplification of the
procedure. The bills met with opposition in the government. The
cabinet adopted some of them in February 2001 after the inte-
rvention of President Putin. The bill to limit the scope of licensed
business activity was approved of by the government at the end
of March 2001. The bills were then submitted to the State Duma.
Despite heavy pressure from ministerial lobbies to keep licenses
and even widen their scope, the list of types of business activity
licensed at federal level was successfully narrowed down in the
project from about 500 to 100. 
Reform of financial relations between 
the centre and the regions
The system of collecting taxes and redistribution of income from
taxes is being gradually simplified. In the state budget for 2000
the percentage of income from taxes collected by the central bud-
get increased in relation to the percentage collected by regional
budgets from 52.8% : 47.2% (1999) to 56.5% : 43.5% (2000)
respectively [data from Russian Economic Trends, Russian-
-European Center for Economic Policy, March 2000]. Despite 
attempts to put up opposition, the regions have since 2001 been
losing their control over redistribution of part of their income from
VAT tax, social insurance and highway funding (99% of personal
income tax remains currently in the regions, and the entire inco-
me from VAT tax goes to the central budget). At the same time 
financial transfers to the regions, regulated in the budget, are on
the increase. 
Almost all of the aforementioned reforms faced opposition from
some deputies in the State Duma (particularly the leftists), the
heads of the regions and conservative pressure groups both out-
side the government and among its members. That is why the fi-
nal version of the reforms was a kind of compromise, though still
much closer to the original drafts made by the President and the
government. 
2. Reforms declared, but still not 
implemented
However, there is a much longer list of reform-oriented actions
that have been subject to significant delay or whose implemen-
tation has not started at all, although they were heralded in spe-
eches made by the President, in the ÔGref StrategyÕ and in the
Priority Action Plan adopted by the government. These reform-
oriented actions included measures of utmost importance for the
future of Russian economy.
The following are worth highlighting:
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A. In the political-administrative sphere
Reform of the judiciary and public 
prosecutorÕs office
This reform is intended to strengthen the role of the courts at the
cost of some limitation of the public prosecutorÕs powers, to im-
prove the functioning of the courts and to limit judicial immunity,
and at the same time to introduce the idea of a term of office for
judges. The reform provides, among other things, for the introduc-
tion of a term of office for those who perform executive functions
in courts; setting a retirement age for judges; simplifying the pro-
cedure of summoning judges to penal responsibility; establishing
a Judicial Chamber to settle disputes between courts as to their
cognisance; increasing both the number of judges and expenditu-
re on the judiciary, and limiting the prosecutorÕ s role in the pro-
ceedings. Some of the reformÕ s guidelines aroused controversy
among judges and liberal groups in connection with their fears of
real limitation to the independence of the judiciary. The only ele-
ment of the reform that is still being implemented is the establish-
ment of separate administrative courts (the legislative process is
now taking place). It has been announced that a p a c kage of bills
concerning the reform will soon be submitted to the State Duma. 
In 2001 the President submitted, but then withdrew, a draft on
changes to the Code of Penal Procedure that would deprive the
public prosecutorÕs office of the right to decide on detention, and
would devolve this competence to the courts (in compliance with
the constitutional norm). The parliament also failed to pass, upon
a motion of the public prosecutorÕs office, other legal changes li-
miting the powers of the office. So the reform of public prosecu-
torÕs office has not actually started. 
Reform of party system and election law
A bill on political parties is going through the legislative process.
An amendment to the election law is in the pipeline. The amend-
ment stipulates, among others things, that the requirement of
membership in aparty be increased to 10,000 members and that
it should be necessary to have branches in at least half the re-
gions of the RF. The parties would be obliged to stand in elections,
and they would receive financing from the state budget. Only po-
litical parties would have the right to put up a candidate for par-
liamentary and presidential elections. 
Reform of security structures
The Gref programme provided for establishing a National Guard
subordinate to the President and also to municipal police outside
the structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, nothing
has been done in this matter and there is no information as to
what the authorities intend to do further.
According to unofficial information, however, there are plans to
combine most of the secret service into a single structure. There
has also been a recent proposal to extend the competence of the
Federal Tax Police Service, and the management of the Service
has been pushing it through. However, the proposal has encoun-
tered opposition from the deputies to the State Duma and so the
legislative body has not begun proceedings. 
Reform of armed forces
The reform of armed forces is intended to achieve the rationali-
sation of their structures and of defence expenditure, and should
create conditions that are conducive to army modernisation, in-
creasing army mobility and creating a professional army. The
plans for changing the armed forcesÕ structure are the subject of
a dispute in army command circles. The dispute especially con-
cerns the role of the nuclear and conventional components of the
armed forces, and also the organisational subordination of some
army units (particularly strategic rocket artillery). At the Security
Council forum, a decision has been taken about limited changes
in this area only, and all major changes have been put on the
back burner until 2006. A decision was taken to reduce the num-
ber of armed forces by 365,000 soldiers and to reduce, by analo-
gy, the number of soldiers in other military groups (a20% reduc-
tion in general until 2005). This reduction, however, is only of
a formal nature because the starting data refer to the state of af-
fairs in 1997, and in most types of armed forces the target ce-
ilings have already been met. At the beginning of April 2001 the
President made personnel changes in the structure of the forces,
which he explained as necessary due to the need to accelerate
reforms. Consequently, a direct result of those changes was that
the secret service and the presidential circles enhanced their
control over armed forces. 
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B. In the social sphere
Pension reform
This reform has not yet entered the implementation phase. Within
the framework of the reform, there are plans to introduce chan-
ges to the principles of pension indexing and the principles accor-
ding to which pensions are calculated, for instance by creating
individual pension accounts and private pension funds. However,
the authorities have noted succeed in agreeing upon a uniform
concept of the reform. Instead, the authorities have increased
pensions by symbolic amounts. But the average pension is still
lower than a subsistence wage. The arrears in payment of pen-
sions, however, have to a large extent been eliminated. 
Reform of health care system
The implementation of the reform has not yet started. Within its
framework there are plans to establish health insurance funds,
increase the independence of health care institutions and to 
introduce the possibility of their partial privatisation. It seems,
however, that there is strong resistance to this reform among left-
wingers; and there is no knowing whether the reform is going to
take place, or if it does what its final form will be. 
C. In the economic sphere
Reform of banking system
According to the authoritiesÕ announcement, a review of the situ-
ation of the banks has been conducted. A bill on the role of the
central bank in the system was adopted, and another one on fi-
nancial guarantees for customers of banks that go bankrupt was
also adopted. It is also planned, among other things, to conduct
renewal or bankruptcy proceedings in some of the banks (these
plans, which had already been announced during the 1998 crisis,
were not actually carried out) and to increase the acceptable
share of competition from foreign banks on the internal market
(from the current 12%). The implementation of the core of this
reform is planned for 2001. 
Reform of property relations
In the face of strong resistance on the part of the kolkhoz lobby
and some parliamentarians, the authorities have for the time be-
ing given up plans to pass the Land Code in the version which in-
troduces private property and free trading in all types of land. In
March 2001 the parliament voted on changes to the Civil Code
that sanctioned private ownership of non-agricultural land. The
authorities came up with compromise proposals concerning per-
mission to trade land. In March 2001 Ð with mediation from Pre-
sident Putin Ð it was initially established that the issue of trading
in agricultural land would lie in the hands of individual governors.
This compromise does not fully satisfy either of the parties; it ac-
tually sanctions the status quo and it infringes on the principle of
uniformity of legal space in Russia. This issue needs to be regu-
lated by law, but until now there has been no such initiative. 
At the end of April the government adopted a draft of the Land 
Code; the issue of trading in agricultural land was excluded from it,
and the draft was submitted to the State Duma. Besides, a bill
was prepared which would introduce strict procedure for proper-
ty nationalisation in special cases, intended to impede annul-
ments of privatisation processes, but the legislative process has
been delayed. 
Reforms of natural monopolies
Reform of Gazprom, the gas monopolist, has not started and is
still being put on the back burner. It is currently planned that the
reform will start in 2001. (The Gref programme initially provided
for the allocation of prices for extraction, transport and export of
natural gas). It does not seem possible that the reform would
start before a change in the post of GazpromÕs managing director
(as Rem Viakhiriev is suppose to step down), which is expected
to take place in spring 2001. 
In December 2000, after several months of discussion, the go-
vernment adopted a draft plan for restructuring the electrical po-
wer engineering monopolist, the Joint Power Engineering systems
company (RAO JES Rossii), which was presented to the govern-
ment by the companyÕs management. This plan was heavily cri-
ticised by the presidential aide for economy, the heads of the re-
gions and some parliamentarians. In January 2001 President Pu-
tin decided that further consultations were necessary, and no de-
cision was taken as to the schedule of restructuring.
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For several months discussions have been going on about refor-
ming the railway system. Draft plans for restructuring predict the
breakup and partial commercialisation of the railway system, and
the gradual admission of competition onto the transport market.
The plans have not been adopted yet and the reform has not star-
ted. However, at the end of April 2001 the government decided to
standardise transport fares in railway transport, as their diversi-
fication for domestic and international ones often led to economic
abuse.
II. Assessing how the reforms
have been implemented
The authorities have been trying to advertise the plans of reform-
oriented actions and to present them Ð particularly abroad Ð as
being very far-reaching and profound. This was most visible with
the Gref programme, which has not actually been fully adopted
yet. The programme was one of the arguments that the Russian au-
thorities used in negotiations with the International Monetary Fu n d
(without, however, successfully coming to an agreement). The
changes that have in fact been implemented were quite limited.
President Putin first of all initiated those changes that could give
him more power and more means to control the situation in the
country. His position on those issues was quite clear and his at-
titude quite firm, although it did leave some room for compromi-
se. Aparticularly good example of this attitude was the reform of
administration. However, the implementation of certain reforms
obviously lacked political will. This particularly applied to particu-
lar structural reforms in the economy and, social reforms that li-
mited the role of the welfare state. 
These reforms have not been implemented with equal intensity.
After the period of spring-summer activity in 2000, autumn wit-
nessed aslowdown in the reforming process. In winter and spring
2001, however, the Kremlin enhanced its activity once again,
obviously trying to make up for some of the delays. 
Undoubtedly one of the reasons for the delays and negligence that
occurred on the way in the field of economic reforms was the ob-
jective difficulty in carrying them out. One example is once again
the reform of the Joint Power Engineering systems (RAO JES Ros-
sii), or the reform of Gazprom. 
The complexity of property relations, the complicated and un-
healthy way the power engineering market functions (including
a spiral of mutual debt), and also its inevitable influence on the
social situation (considerable price rises of energy carriers for in-
dividual customers) could not possibly be conducive to making
radical decisions in this sphere. 
Besides, other crucial factors have impeded reforms, particular-
ly strong opposition to some reforms on the part of various lob-
bies, and also some parliamentarians and regional authorities.
For instance, the oil and gas lobbies were against radical restruc-
turing of RAO JES and liberalising the market in electrical power
engineering Ð as that would mean, in the longer term, the in-
crease of extraction costs; the lobby of governors also voiced its
opposition, as it did not wish to lose control over the allocation of
allowances in energy prices or of the revenue from shares of lo-
cal agencies; conservative forces (communists, agrarians and
regional representatives) in the State Duma did not want to let
Gazprom undergo restructuring, nor did they want full legalisation
of private property and free trading in land. 
Opposition to some reforms was visible also within the govern-
ment and in the structures of other federal administration bodies.
Many of the changes planned were blocked at the stage of inter-
ministerial consultations. Each Ministry was involved in trade
lobbying; they defended their powers and sources of income.
Such activities resulted, for instance, in reducing the scope of
planned reductions in customs duty rates, and limiting the list of
licenses and concessions to be abolished. One of the factors that
impeded changes was also the involvement of some high state
officials in unhealthy connections implying frauds and corruption.
The most suspected Ministries were those of Transport and Nuc-
lear Power Engineering, which were headed by people linked with
the so-called the Kremlin ÔfamilyÕ. 
Another factor which was not always conducive to radical actions
was the attitude of the key decision-maker Ð President Putin. The
President did not engage in any disputes about reforms, and he
only intervened in exceptional cases. A good example was his de-
tachment from the very bitter dispute over the pattern of RAO JES
RossiiÕs reform (the dispute led to clashes between leading poli-
ticians from the government and the presidential administration).
After a longer period of keeping a low profile, however, the presi-
dent presentedÔcompromiseÕ solutions to the heated debate on
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private ownership of land, and also intervened in the issue of de-
regulation bills. 
The majority of issues that have aroused controversy and enta-
iled severe consequences for society have been kept in abeyance
by the authorities, who have engaged in lengthy consultations.
The PresidentÕs method was to appoint one commission after
another, and to let the different views confront each other. An
example can be the Governor IshayevÕscommission, which drew
up a concept of reform that was to be compete with the Gref pro-
gramme. After it had been presented, President Putin ordered
both Ð almost completely contradictory Ð programmes to be
combined! 
It seems that the PresidentÕs key motive was a wish to maintain
high social support. The President did not want to be associated
with any disputes, or with any decisions that have severe socio-
economic consequences for society. Moreover, by making con-
stant attempts to reach a compromise, Vladimir Putin wanted to
maintain the impression of a consolidated society, which was
a fundamental slogan of his actions. 
In April 2001 certain symptoms seemed to herald achange in the
PresidentÕs attitude towards reforms and the will to accelerate
the process. In his official speeches the President started to give
unambiguous support to the liberal model of socio-economic re-
forms. The presidential address to the Federal Assembly delive-
red at the beginning of April 2001, which emphasised economic
reforms, was a declaration of apolicy of cautious economic libe-
ralism. Other heralds of such policy were included in other docu-
ments on economic issues that were adopted by the President
and the government (including the PresidentÕs budget message
for 2002). The pressure on the government and the parliament,
which was coming from presidential circles, increased. It is too
early, however, to assess whether it constitutes the beginning of
a new Kremlin policy, and whether it means that the idea of poli-
tical consensus and stability has been given up.
III. Principal changes 
in Russian political and social 
life under Vladimir Putin
Apart from the aforementioned reforms, the Russian government
together with Putin have undertaken a number of other steps.
This led to specific changes, in comparison with Boris YeltsinÕs
times, as far as domestic policy is concerned. It is worth charac-
terising some major tendencies in this field, paying particular 
attention to political and social issues. Assessing the consequen-
ces of economic reforms requires the situation to be presented
from a wider perspective. 
Under PutinÕs rule, genuine political opposition has effecti-
vely disappeared from the State Duma, or lower house of
Parliament. The composition of the State Duma after the Decem-
ber 1999 election reveals the domination of groups obedient or
loyal towards the Kremlin. The character of left-wing (communi-
sts and agrarians) and right-wing (liberals of the Yabloko and
SPS) groupsÕ opposition towards the President is symbolic or pu-
rely verbal in character. The State Duma has thus become nothing
but a tool of legislative politics in the PresidentÕs hands. Never-
theless, the State Duma is resisting some projects initiated by the
Government, especially those concerning the most controversial
issues, such as tax reform or the budget. The objection of the
communists and agrarians in the State Duma has contributed to
postponing the decision to pass the Land Code.
The political stance of some fractions and groups of the State Du-
ma deputies is not infrequently inspired by informal rival groups
in the central government apparatus (as was proved by an
unsuccessful attempt to introduce the vote of no confidence in
KasyanovÕs government).
The influence of regional leaders on the PresidentÕs authori-
ty was weakened in the course of last year, although their re-
gional position remained quite strong. The administrative re-
form now being carried out means that regional leaders are losing
the importance of their role as significant political actors on the
national stage, and that the position of the Federation Council has
also dwindled. Regional leaders have their representatives in the
Federation Council (every time a regional election takes place).
The regionsÕ control over the redistribution of budget income has
also diminished. Furthermore, the central government has sup-
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pressed all attempts made by some regions to operate their own
independent foreign policy. On the other hand, the KremlinÕs con-
trol over the regions is not total; the Kremlin has apparently not
worked out a holistic strategy for its regional policy. Despite their
efforts, the PresidentÕs representatives have not succeeded in
fulfilling their function of controlling the regional leaders. The rela-
tionships between some regional authorities and the Pr e s i-
d e n tÕ s representatives in certain federal districts have become mo-
re and more tense, as the latter aim to increase their real power. 
While forcing administrative reform, in some issues (such as hin-
dering the procedure of dismissing regional leaders by the Presi-
dent, or extending the governorsÕ power) the Kremlin has conduc-
ted a give-and-take-policy towards the local authorities, which
lets them maintain a strong position in their regions. The Presi-
dent accepted a statutory amendment which allows regional le-
aders to stand for election to the third term of office. The Kremlin
rarely took an active part in any regional election campaign, and
the candidates it did support were often defeated. The Kremlin 
took advantage of administrative methods or pressure to get rid
of inconvenient governors only in exceptional cases (such as in
the Kursk district or the Chukotka area).
Instead of threatening (as was the case with the administrative
reform), the President continued to multiply incentives for the re-
gional leaders. Avital factor of this policy was the creation of the
PresidentÕs consultative body. The State Council, in September
2000, to which all the regional leaders were invited. The Presi-
dent has paid particular attention to the functioning of the new
extra-constitutional body, and has sent it the more important pro-
jects for social and economic reforms, which in consequence led
to their postponement.
Apart from a very few exceptions, there are no real opponents to
the Kremlin among the regional leaders. However they still have
some tools at their disposal which make them able to silently sa-
botage the CentreÕs policy. Their stance is of importance to the
successful implementation of the CentreÕs reform plans, and to
the enforcement of administrative decisions. Unfavourable social
and economic conditions, and the limited extent of fulfilling the
stateÕs tutelary role, are also conducive to the situation.
The relationships between the representatives of big busi-
ness Ð the so-called oligarchs (who constituted one of the
pillars of the presidentÕspower in YeltsinÕssystem) Ð and the
authorities has changed. These oligarchs have in general lost
their political influence, but some of them are still taking 
advantage of their strong links with the authorities to reap
economic benefits. In the Ônew realityÕ, they have become peti-
tioners striving for their personal and economic security. Political
loyalty towards the authorities, and willingness to share income
from running their businesses with the country, have become the
main criteria for assessing their situation. Those who were less
loyal could expect harassment on the part of the Prosecutor 
GeneralÕs Office, the tax police and the Account Committee 
(the counterpart of the Polish Chief Board of Supervision). On the
other hand, the Kremlin has not persisted in executing the principle
of ãdebarring the oligarchs from power in equal measure.Ó Some
of them, however, have remained in genuinely privileged relation-
ships with the authorities. This particularly concerns Roman
Abramovich (of the Sibnieft company), Alexander Mamut (of
MDM Bank) and Piotr Aven (of the ãAlfaÓ group), who were con-
nected with the so-called Kremlin Family and with high officials
from the PresidentÕs administration.
What the authorities need is constructive business cooperation,
without which maintaining a balanced fiscal and budget policy
will prove to be extremely difficult. Taxes from the oligarchs fill the
Treasury. Moreover, the Kremlin expected them to provide finan-
cial support for some social initiatives and to invest in the Rus-
sian economy. Even the businessmen themselves have begun to
get organised; in November 2000 twenty-seven Russian busi-
ness leaders (apart from those closely related with the Kremlin)
entered the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs,
transforming the organisation into a strong pressure group.
The KremlinÕs influence on the mass media, especially on
electronic media with its wide range of possibilities for sha-
ping public opinion, has also grown. Under the banner of libe-
rating the media from the oligarchsÕ influence, the country has
managed to expand its control over the media market. At first the
Kremlin fully controlled the RTR television channel; then it took
over the control of RTRÕsoffices and finally, in February 2001, the
financial and administrative control of the ORT television channel
(hitherto controlled by the oligarch Boris Berezovsky). Since
spring 2000 the opinionated media holding Media-Most (owned
by Vladimir Gusinsky), which included the nationwide television
NTV among other elements, has been subject to repression. 
At the beginning of 2001 the activities of the ProsecutorÕs Gene-
ralÕs Office, the tax police and other state services with the sup-
port of the holdingÕs co-owner Gazprom, loyal towards the autho-
rities, brought the threat of closure to Media-Most and of Gusin-
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skyÕs imprisonment; Spain, however, has refused his extradition
to Russia. Finally, in the first few days of April 2001, Gazprom Ð
despite strong protests on the part of journalists and society Ð 
took full control of NTV television, as well as the majority of the
holdingÕsother media. The Kremlin thus acquired full political su-
pervision over all national television channels.
Power structures have become valuable instruments of Pu-
tinÕs domestic policy, and have gradually turned into pillars
of his authority.
The Security Council Ð formally considered as the Presi-
dentÕsconsultative body regarding security issues Ð actually pro-
ved to be a forum for making fundamental political decisions.
More new members have entered the Council, among whom was
a group of representatives of the power structures; in May 2000
the PresidentÕsrepresentatives, and subsequently the chief of the
General Staff, were co-opted into the Council. The range of this
bodyÕsactivities has also broadened. The Security Council appa-
ratus indeed had certain sections that duplicated the Govern-
mentÕs authority and played a significant role in formulating and
reviewing the plans of the countryÕs reforms.
In spite of what was expected, the CouncilÕs competence has not
been formally expanded. It might have been connected with age-
neral unwillingness to burden this body with formal responsibili-
ty for its resolutions. PutinÕs decision to dismiss Sergei Ivanov
from his function as the Security CouncilÕssecretary at the begin-
ning of April 2001 may initiate the diminution of this structu-
reÕs importance which mainly resulted from IvanovÕs position. 
The role of the special services, and particularly of the Federal
Security Service, in the countryÕs structures has strengthened.
These services constituted vital personnel resources and an analy-
tical base for the structures of the countryÕ s authorities. Members
of these authorities who fulfil important functions, and in whom the
President places his confidence, come from the services.
The army has had more influence on formulating the principles of
the countryÕs foreign and security policy. The number of service-
men in the central administrative body has also increased. Putin
has made an attempt to improve the armed forcesÕ prestige. 
In spite of this, the army has not become an independent politi-
cal power, and remains under the growing control of the special
services (especially after the appointment of Sergei Ivanov as Mi-
nister of Defence, and after changes to the personnel of the armed
forcesÕ administration at the beginning of April 2001).
The Prosecutor GeneralÕs Office, the fiscal inspectorate and
other such institutions have in fact became tools of the Krem-
linÕsstruggle with its political opponents. Their role in the country
has been augmented at the expense of the judiciary. The Kremlin
intensified its pressure on the latter, mainly due to the interven-
tion of the Prosecutor General and the special services. 
The power of the prosecuting organs was spectacularly demon-
strated in January 2001 when Ð under their influence Ð Putin ma-
de the unprecedented decision to repeal amendments to the Pe-
nal Proceedings Code which he had himself made before. They
concerned depriving the Prosecutor GeneralÕsOffice of the right to
sanction arrests as well as make searches; these rights were
meant to be transferred to the courts.
Democratic freedoms in Russia, especially law and order as
well as the freedom of speech, were threatened.
Despite the slogan of ãthe dictatorship of lawÓ which Putin pro-
claimed, symptoms of violation of the rule of law have become
more numerous. The law has been ever more frequently used in
the service of extemporary political goals. The representatives of
the home affairs department, the Prosecutor GeneralÕsOffice, the
fiscal inspectorate etc. have resorted to encroaching on the pro-
cedures in force, as well as threatening or blackmailing the Krem-
linÕs opponents. During the proceedings of an enquiry there were
occurrences of the use of undue force. Doubts whether judicial
independence was respected by the authorities and the special
services arose during the espionage cases concerning Pope and
Sutyagin, as well as the legal proceedings involving regional elec-
tions and the Media-Most holding. The planned introduction of te-
nure for judges may constitute yet another threat in that field.
All the activities Putin has initiated in the area of mass media ha-
ve endangered the hitherto unlimited freedom of speech in
Russia. Throwing the Media-Most holding into disarray may soon
bring about the unification of all electronic broadcasting under
the KremlinÕs control. Journalistic circles are more prone to em-
ploy self-censorship. The Kremlin is given tools to limit criticism
in the media, for instance under the pretext of protecting State
secrets, by the changes envisaged in the press law, and by the
ãDoctrine of Information SecurityÓ passed by the Security Coun-
cil and accepted by the President in September 2000.
The changes in legislature (concerning political parties and elec-
toral laws to be introduced) which are now being realised may li-
mit the development of political pluralism in Russia. In the
Ônew realityÕ, only the most powerful among the already existing
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political groups could expect to actively participate in the coun-
tryÕs political life. All the changes that have been made give evi-
dence of the KremlinÕsdrive towards forming the political stage in
a shape desired by the presently governing party.
State propaganda in the media has been conducive to a xe-
nophobic stance. The authorities strived to strengthen the sta-
teÕs role in social and political life, and created an atmosphere of
menace connected with the alleged activity of foreign intelligence
on the territory of the Russian Federation. The Kremlin took ad-
vantage of the national television channel which remained under
its control to create a negative image of some western countries
(the USA in particular) as well as some countries of the Common-
wealth of Independent States (Georgia and Ukraine). This might
testify to its wish to negatively mobilise the society on the basis
of the image of an external enemy.
Despite the strengthening of the authority of the presidential
institution, there are still anumber of other factors that limit
the PresidentÕs authority.
The lack of homogeneity in the ruling group also limits the Presi-
dentÕs authority [see Appendix III]. People from three circles form
a balance system of its own within the central government appa-
ratus (i.e. in the Government, the presidential administration and
the Security Council).
First of all there is the former ÔYeltsin groupÕ, among them pe-
ople connected with the so-called Kremlin Family , who loyally
cooperate with the new President. The main interest of the ÔFami-
lyÕ members focuses on counteracting attempts to explain and
account for the economic abuses in which they had taken part.
They are also concerned with supporting their business partners,
and preventing any political and economic decisions that lead to
clarifying the proceedings, increasing the stateÕscontrol over mo-
ney streams or putting an end to corruption. They have conserva-
tive groups which oppose the liberalisation of the economy on
their side.
Secondly, there are the ÔliberalsÕÐ economists of liberal opinions
supported by Putin Ð who do not form aclose group. Among them
there are those who at different periods of their career were con-
nected with and promoted by the influential (until quite lately)
Anatoly Chubais (the so-called Chubais group). These were the
ÔliberalsÕ who created the ideas of current reforms (ÔGrefÕs pro-
grammeÕ) and in particular their economic aspects. What brings
them together are their concurrent views on the economy Ð they
are convinced that there is a need to carry out definite reforms in
the spirit of liberalism to limit the tutelary functions of the state
and to fight with the Ôgrey areaÕ, diverse unhealthy practices and
abuses in the economic field, mainly by deregulating the economy.
The so-called Petersburg group is aheterogeneous group of the
PresidentÕs trustworthy co-operators who owe their careers to
him. Most of them come from St. Petersburg, just like Putin him-
self. Some of them, the so-called ÔChekistsÕ, used to work for the
special services (the former KGB and the Federal Security Servi-
ce), and can nowadays be characterised by deep personal loyal-
ty towards Putin and a readiness to fight political opposition and
the PresidentÕs critics. They are convinced of a further need to
strengthen presidential authority, to build a Ôstrong stateÕ and to
carry on the process of centralisation. They tend to support the
process of augmenting state control of the economy, which they
perceive as the main remedy for the multiplying abuses. 
The partial divergence of the groupÕsopinions and interests leads
to conflicts in the government apparatus. Putin plays the role of
arbiter in those conflicts.
The fundamental role of the widely-understood power structures
in the PresidentÕs circle also contributes to a narrowing of both
Putin and the GovernmentÕsroom for political and economic ma-
noeuvre, making the authorities reckon with their particular inte-
rests (as in the case of Chechnya policy or budget expenses on
security and defence).
Another important factor which creates favourable conditions for
the PresidentÕs self-limitation in taking advantage of his strong
authority is his consideration for public opinion. It can be in-
ferred from the PresidentÕs public speeches that he deems main-
taining social and political stability, and mobilising common effort
based on feelings of solidarity, an indispensable condition for the
Russian reforms to succeed. Moreover, Putin cares about main-
taining high level of social support (about 70 per cent) which gi-
ves him a strong political argument against his opponents.
This all obliges the President to avoid taking radical decisions,
defining his standpoint on controversial issues or to suggest
a compromise between contradictory opinions and programmes,
which creates a false impression of consensus. This also applies
to the strategy of the PresidentÕs activity of creating successive
collective bodies (interdepartmental commissions) which are 
intended to diminish responsibility.
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It should be also pointed out that there are other objective 
obstacles limiting the PresidentÕs power. One such permanent
factor is RussiaÕs extensive size, which makes it difficult to in-
troduce homogenous legislation and enforce administrative deci-
sions. Some features of the Russian communityÕs mentality are
of similar, limiting character Ð informal rules and bonds prevail
over legal regulations. The low efficiency, at different levels, of
the state machine , resulting from their faulty organisation (also
in the sense of an over-extended structure of the federal executi-
ve bodies and the GovernmentÕs complicated decision-making
process), the impotence of staff as well as various psychopatho-
logical bonds and phenomena, particularly corruption, contribute
to all the difficulties in enforcing decisions.
General conclusions and 
f o r e c a s t
1. The ruling group in Russia evidently does not have any homo-
genous and holistic strategy for the countryÕs further develop-
ment. Apart from its inner divisions, the group has diverse ideas
of the countryÕs politics. PutinÕs political stance is imprecise; he
has tended to avoid assuming an unequivocal attitude towards
controversial issues. The Russian leader has attempted to recon-
cile the task of modernising Russia with the task of social mobi-
lisation. Ensuring economic growth and non-destabilisation of
social situation have been his imperatives. Putin did not want to
support any reformist activities that would entail Ð even tempo-
rarily Ð lowering the populationÕs living standard and simulta-
neously putting his significant popularity in jeopardy.
2. The KremlinÕs policy has been oriented at strengthening the
PresidentÕs authority and extending the instruments of control
over the countryÕs situation. The President has limited the influ-
ence on politics of some alternative centres which have impeded
his authority: the parliamentary opposition, regional leaders, re-
presentatives of business and oppositionist media. Vladimir Pu-
tin has strengthened his real authority; however some limitations
still remain. The Government has to make compromises with the
Parliament; the KremlinÕs control of regional situations is still in-
complete; some oligarchs remain close to the authorities; the
Kremlin has not yet acquired full political control over the media;
informal groups of the central authority apparatus, which empo-
wer security structures and numerous lobbies, influence the Pre-
sident; Putin is preoccupied with maintaining a high level of pu-
blic support.
3. The authorities have carried out some significant administra-
tive and fiscal reforms. However neither fundamental economic
and social reforms, nor any crucial changes in the area of secu-
rity and administration of justice have yet been made. Besides
some objective difficulties (such as the complex character of the
process itself, and difficulties in changing the current state of af-
fairs) and the lack of homogeneity in the government, such a si-
tuation is caused by the insufficient political will of the main po-
litical leaders together with Putin, as well as by the Presi-
dentÕs individual way of exerting his authority.
4. The democratic system in Russia is gradually becoming pure-
ly formal. The Kremlin has avoided changing the constitution, but
is creating mechanisms and institutions which infringe its laws
and simultaneously makes it difficult to introduce the rules of po-
litical pluralism, freedom of speech and law and order. What con-
stitutes even an greater menace for RussiaÕs democracy are tra-
ceable changes in the national mentality. State propaganda tries
to hide all phenomena which distort the PresidentÕspositive ima-
ge and impair the promotion of consolidating the society around
the authoritiesÕ policies. This is designed to evoke the feeling of
menace from an external enemy, to fan a mania for espionage
and intensify the feeling of distrust towards the western world.
Instead of creating an open society, the authorities are trying to
build rather a Ôcounter-espionage societyÕ. In order to generate
Ôpolitical and moral unityÕ in society, the authorities have taken
over the control of nationwide electronic media and formed apar-
ty system which excludes any Ôunconstructive opposition.Õ
5. While in authority Putin has so far avoided making radical de-
cisions that would be controversial and evoke painful social ef-
fects. The President has tried to preserve his image of an arbiter
who does not interfere with divisions but remains preoccupied
with social affairs. Positive stimuli (persuasion, incentives, bribe-
ry, security guarantees) have predominated over negative ones
(threats, blackmailing, administrative methods and the use of
force) in the KremlinÕsactivity, although both have been used. All
the changes taking place in Russia these days are of an evolutio-
nary, not revolutionary character. Putin is very wary of introducing
changes; he does so only when necessary and when the risk of
defeat is quite low.
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6. The PresidentÕsstaffing policy was based on the system of ba-
lancing the influence of various groups. However, the decisions
he took in April 2001 (concerning personnel and the so-called
force departments in particular), and the manifestos he delivered
for the Federal Assembly are yet further steps on the way to en-
hance the influence of the ÔPetersburg groupÕ and the ÔliberalsÕ at
the same time. Thus, in the near future (within the limits of the
GovernmentÕs restructuring, that is to take place in May 2001,
and the expected changes in the presidential administration)
a modification of the system of power in the ruling elite Ð by cre-
ating a united ÔteamÕ from the members of the Petersburg group
(and by extension limiting the influence of the Family) Ð might be
expected. The PresidentÕs problem is an insufficient number of
personnel. The direction and depth of the changes still remains
an open issue. It seems quite reasonable to expect an accelera-
tion in the tempo of the changes (which has so far been impeded
by inner divisions in the government apparatus). Everything de-
pends on whether the role of the ÔliberalsÕ is enhanced in the new
system of power. If this happens, there will be a chance to boost
reforms and maintain the balance of growth under the protection
of astrong presidential power.
7. The Kremlin wants to have as much room for political and eco-
nomic manoeuvre as possible. By exploiting the instruments of
power, the Kremlin would like to accomplish deep liberal changes
or preserve the social and economic system formally intact. The-
se activities are accompanied by the stateÕsattempts to augment
its control over political and social life. Further postponement of
radical steps in the economic and social fields, and failure to take
advantage of the favourable conditions resulting from the good
economic situation and the high level of social support for the
President, may lead to the loss of any chance of modernisation
and long-lasting growth. It could be even worse if the present fa-
vourable economic condition, caused by high prices of crude oil
on the world markets, should deteriorate. This could make the 
authorities focus on protecting their security in the face of public
tensions, and consequently evoke the intensification of authorita-
rianism.
8. Since April 2001 an intensification of the authoritiesÕ political
activity can be observed, mainly in the area of social and econo-
mic reforms. However, there are still certain doubts as to whether
the President and his inner circle have enough political will to
break with the policy of compromises in favour of hastening libe-
ral reforms. Moreover, any further possibility of reconciling autho-
ritarian tendencies in politics with liberal ones in the economy 
seems quite debatable.
Marek Menkiszak (Russian Department)
The text was written at the end of April 2001.
Appendix I
Programme elements in the presentation 
of (then) Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
entitled ÔRussia at turn of millenniumÕ, 
given at a meeting of the ÔUnityÕ movement, 
29 December 1999
(bold type: Marek Menkiszak)
I. Analysis of situation
1. Principal problems
long-term fall in GNP
production and export specialisation in raw materials
low labour efficiency
low technological level of production
low level of internal and foreign investment
low innovation and weak competitiveness of production
fall in the real income of the population
weak indicators of social development.
2. Causes
inheritance from the Soviet system: poor structure of economy,
disfavour of modernisation and competition, suffocation of initiative
unavoidable errors and mistakes in reforms already conducted.
II. Bases of policy
1. Introductory theses
there is no alternative to a universal path of reform
questions concerning the effectiveness of market mechanisms,
overcoming social division, goals to unify the people, Ru s s i aÕ s p l a-
ce in the world, proposed level of development, existing supplies.
2. Conclusions from history, and the policy 
imperative
The Communist period; achievements, but above all a dead end
Russia is exhausted with shocks and revolution; the pa-
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tience of the nation has reached its limit; it is necessary to
formulate a strategy for the renaissance and rebirth of Russia,
and to realise this in an evolutionary manner in conditions of
stabilisation and without worsening living conditions.
It is not possible to copy foreign experiences; Russia must
find its own path of renewal which links the universal princi-
ples of market economy and democracy with Russian reality.
3. General tasks
indispensable, fast and stable economic and social development
creation and initiation of political strategy
creating and Ôideology of growthÕ.
4. Sphere of ideas
ideological internal disintegration is a hindrance for re-
forms
an official state ideology is not essential, and social ac-
cord cannot be enforced
social accord and consolidation are preconditions for the
success of reforms
the people desire stabilisation, security, the possibility to
plan for the future; they desire peace, safety and the rule of
law
elements of this consolidation are internalised universal
values and also Russian core values
these Russian core values are: patriotism (pride in the fa-
therland and pursuit of its rebirth); sense of great power status
(modern, creative thinking, supported by geopolitical, economic
and cultural conditioning); statehood (the strong state as initia-
tor, source and guarantee of order); social solidarity (natural 
disposition to collectivism and paternalism)
the results of parliamentary elections in 1999 are proof of the
peopleÕs inclination to stability and accord
faith in the responsibility of political forces, and their under-
standing of the necessity to consolidate all Ôhealthy powersÕ.
III. Main premises and goals of policy
1. The strong state
the need for strong government, realised through rationali-
sation of government structures; raising the levels of professio-
nalism, discipline and responsibility in the personnel cadres; the
battle with corruption; selecting the best specialists; favouring
the construction of a civil society; increasing the role and autho-
rity of legal bodies; redefining federal relations; battle with crime;
there is no necessity for urgent changes to the constitution
ensure the accordance of established law with the constitution
strengthen executive authority, and societyÕs control over it.
2. An effective economy
a long-term, comprehensive strategy of development is neces-
sary
the necessity of forming a system for the state to regulate the
economy and social policy (the state as regulator and co-ordina-
tor); the maxim of Ôas much government as necessary; as much
freedom as possibly Õ
a policy of stimulating growth
a policy of investment with elements of state interventionism,
which creates an appropriate climate for investment
conducting an active industrial policy, with priority given to
modern fields 
supporting innovative thinking, branches which avoid a raw-
materials basis, export of fuel, energy and raw materials
credits, loans, and state discounts
structural policy based on equal rights for economic entities
rational regulation of natural-resource monopolies
financial policy: increase in the effectiveness of budget, tax re-
form, liquidation of cash-less transactions, support for low infla-
tion and stabilisation of the exchange rate, creating financial and
stock markets, restructuring the banking system
liquidation of the Ôgrey areaÕ and of organised crime in the eco-
nomy, by improving the efficiency of investigative authorities and
tightening controls
integration with the world economy by supporting Russian
companies and exporters, fighting trade discrimination, passing
an anti-dumping law, gaining access to the WTO
a modern agricultural policy, linking state assistance with mar-
ket reforms in the countryside (including land ownership)
any transformations causing a worsening of peopleÕs
living standards are ruled out 
a constant increase in the populationÕs real income
supporting education, culture and the health service
IV. Conclusions 
concurrent, creative work is the only way to avoid the threat of
Russia descending to the level of second-class state
it is essential to unite and prepare the nation for hard work.
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Appendix II
Important elements of the programme of top-priority actions for implementation
the ÔStrategy for the development of the RF to 2010Õ (the so-called Gref 
programme), and the actual implementation of these measures
Task to be implemented
forming territorial bodies of federal
authority in the regions, and 
appointing presidential representatives
in federal districts
devising a plan for judiciary reform,
including change in the status 
of judges, increase in the rights 
of individuals and institutions 
in the penal process, and an increase
in the number of judges
creating a system for dismissing 
the heads of regional administrations
who break the law
demarcation of the rights 
of federal and regional bodies 
to executive authority
creation of a National Guard 
of the RF, which would be directly 
answerable to the president
creation of a municipal militia outside
the Internal MinistryÕs jurisdiction








third quarter of 2000
third quarter of 2000
third quarter of 2000







according to official, 
limited version 








State of actual implementation, 
as of 30 April 2001
carried out on time
delay; in January 2001 consultations
on an introductory plan began
carried out on time
not carried out, planned in 2001
not carried out
not carried out
delay; already discussed at introduc-
tory level in relation to court directors 
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changing the manner of forming 
the Federal Council by introducing 
direct senatorial elections
introducing administrative judiciary
passing the second part of Tax Code
to reform the tax system
reform of the banking system, 
including increasing competition, 
liquidation or reform of some banks,
conformity with international 
accounting standards
acceptance of a non-deficit budget 
budgetary reform, including division
of income between the centre and the
regions, and consolidation of employ-
ment and highway funds
legal regulation of property 
nationalisation 
dividing the tariffs of transport 
and sale of natural gas
simplification of the procedure 
for registering economic activity
passed in an altered version 
(designated by heads of executive
authorities and regional legislatures)
in September 2000; to be gradually
implemented by 1 January 2002
legislative process begun 
at end of 2000
implemented by December 2000; 
came into force 1 January 2001
delay; planned for 2001; 
in March 2001 a law was passed 
regulating the position 
of the central bank
carried out in December 2000 
(but without consideration of servicing
foreign debt at an appropriate level);
in March 2001 sequestration 
of the budget was carried out)
carried out on time in moderated
form, within the framework 
of the budget and amendments 
to the Tax Code
delay; in January 2001 legislative
process of the law was begun
not carried out
delay; a plan for this law has been
prepared, and accepted 
by the government in March 2001 
at the presidentÕs request 
second quarter of
2001
2- third quarter of
2001
second quarter of




third quarter of 2000
third quarter of 2000
third quarter of 2000
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abolition of barriers to movement of
persons and goods between regions




completing the process of 
establishing the state treasuryÕs
control over financial resources which
possess fiscal entities
separating costs for extraction and
transport of gas
reform of rail transport, 
including its break-up
creating a system of guarantees of
bank deposits
liquidation or change of most social
discounts from 1 January 2001
reform to pensions 
(including methods of calculation 
and index-linking)
granting independence to, 
and beginning privatisation of,
some health service institutions 
in the process of being partially 
completed
delay; a plan for this law has been
prepared and was accepted by 
government at the end of March 2001
not carried out
delay; being carried out
not carried out
planned; preparation of the plan 
is under way; in April 2001 
the government established 
the abolition of the division of freight
tariffs into international and national
rates on an introductory basis
in March 2001 a law was passed
concerning guarantees for customers
of insolvent banks
partially carried out, 
process continues
not carried out; planned 
(no central concept has been agreed)







first quarter of 2001
first quarter of 2001
second quarter of
2001
third quarter of 2001
third quarter of 2000
third quarter of 2000










March to April 2001
March 2001
Appendix III
List of members of informal groups 
in the central government apparatus*
I. Old Yeltsin team
1. Linked with so-called Kremlin family
Aleksandr Voloshin; head of PresidentÕs Administration
Vladislav Surkov; deputy head of PresidentÕs Administration
Aleksandr Abramov; assistant to President of RF (deputy head
of PresidentÕs Administration until March 2001)
Jokhan Polliyeva; deputy head of PresidentÕsAdministration
Mikhail Kasyanov; prime minister
Nikolai Aksyonenko; minister of communication
Yevgeni Adamov; minister of nuclear energy until April 2001
Mikhail Lesin; minister for press and information
Viktor Kaluzhny ; vice-minister for foreign affairs and presiden-
tial envoy to the Caspian region
Igor Shuvalov***; chief minister for government apparatus
Vladimir Ustinov; general procurator
Mikhail Zurabov; head of Pension Fund
2. Others
Sergei Prichodko; deputy head of PresidentÕs Administration
Yevgeni Lisov; deputy head of PresidentÕs Administration
Ilya Klebanov**/***; vice-premier for military-industrial complex
Viktor Khristyenko***; vice-premier for relations with the regions
and the states of the CIS
Valentina Matveyenko; vice-premier for social affairs
Aleksei Gordieyev; vice-premier for agriculture and food, mini-
ster of agriculture
Igor Ivanov; minister of foreign affairs
Igor Sergieyev; until April 2001 minister of defence, currently
adviser to President of RF
Vladimir Rushailo**; until April 2001 minister of internal affairs,
currently secretary of Security Council of RF
Sergei Shoygu**; minister for emergency situations; leader of
ÔUnityÕ party
Farid Gazizullin***; minister of state treasury
Aleksandr Pochinok***; minister of labour and social affairs
Sergei Stepashin**; head of Chamber of Accounts
Viktor Gyerashchenko; head of Central Bank of Russia
II. Liberals
1. ÔChubais groupÕ
Aleksei Kudrin; vice-premier for financial policy, minister of fi-
nances
Aleksandr Zhukov; head of committee for budgeting of State 
D u m a
2. Others
German Gref***; minister for trade and economic development
Ilya Yuzhanov; minister for anti-monopoly policy
Aleksei Ulukayev; vice-minister of finances
III. PutinÕs ÔPetersburg groupÕ
1. ÔChekistsÕ
Sergei Ivanov; until April 2001 secretary of Security Council of
RF, currently minister of defence
Viktor Ivanov; deputy head of PresidentÕs Administration
Nikolai Patrushev; head of Federal Security Service
Sergei Lebedyev; head of Foreign Intelligence Service
Viktor Cherkyesov; representative of president in North-West
Federal District
2. Others
Dmitri Medvyedev; first deputy head of Pr e s i d e n tÕ sA d m i n i s t r a t i o n
Dmitri Kozak; deputy head of PresidentÕs Administration
Igor Syechin; deputy head of PresidentÕsAdministration; head in
office of PresidentÕs Chancellery
Vladimir Kozhin ; head of Administration of Presidential Affairs
(Administrative-Economic Office)
Leonid Reyman***; minister of communication
Andrei Illarionov****; adviser to president on economic affairs
* information based on reports in Russian media
** member of the Ôold teamÕ, still favoured by President Putin
*** previously linked with Anatoly Chubais
**** treated separately; occasionally linked with the ÔliberalsÕ
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